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Using discourse to restore organisational legitimacy:  
‘CEO-speak’ after an incident in a German nuclear power plant 
  
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
We analyse managerial discourse in corporate communication (‘CEO-speak’) during a 
six month period following a legitimacy-threatening event in the form of an incident in 
a German nuclear power plant. As discourses express specific stances expressed by a 
group of people who share particular beliefs and values, they constitute an important 
means of restoring organisational legitimacy when social rules and norms have been 
violated. Using an analytical framework based on legitimacy as a process of reciprocal 
sense-making and consisting of three levels of analysis which capture the relationship 
between text and context, we investigate the discourse used by CEOs in their initial and 
subsequent accounts of the incident. We find that CEOs aim to negotiate a resolution 
between their initial account and organisational audiences’ incongruent interpretations 
of the event by adopting an ad hoc normative attitude to stakeholders. This manifests 
itself in the strategic use of the discourse of stakeholder engagement as a means of 
signalling change, yet maintaining the status quo. It suggests that CEOs strategically 
use discourse to manufacture organisational audiences’ consent regarding the continued 
operation of the nuclear power plant affected by the incident. Our findings contribute 
to the critical corporate communication literature which regards corporate narrative 
reporting as a means of consolidating the private interests of corporations, rather than 
increasing transparency and accountability. 
 
Keywords: Legitimacy, Impression Management, Nuclear Industry, Discourse, 
Stakeholder Management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The nuclear industry’s biggest challenge is “not one of technical or even cost 
difficulties, but of maintaining a veneer of political legitimacy” (Stoett, 2003, p. 99). 
This is particularly the case in Germany which is characterised by a strong anti-nuclear 
movement. The recent accident in the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan re-
ignited the public debate on nuclear power in Germany. Wide-spread anti-nuclear 
protests forced the German government to revoke its plans to extend the life span of 
Germany’s seventeen nuclear power plants by an average of twelve years. An incident 
in a German nuclear power plant thus constitutes an interesting context to examine the 
strategies adopted by management to restore organisational legitimacy during a public 
controversy. 
 
Organisational legitimacy refers to “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  
Legitimacy is considered vital for an organisation’s survival, as it attracts resources and 
the continued support from its constituents (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Corporate 
communication constitutes an important means for management to demonstrate that the 
organisation’s practices are congruent with society’s values, norms, and beliefs 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994). In times of crisis or controversy, such 
as during financial scandals, environmental disasters, and major structural re-
organisation, management uses corporate communication to restore organisational 
legitimacy by persuading audiences that the organisation is re-aligning its structures 
and procedures with social norms and rules (Elsbach, 2001).  
 
1.1 Motivation, objectives and contribution of the paper 
The aim of the paper is to unravel the role of managerial discourse in the construction 
of organisational legitimacy by Vattenfall, a Swedish state-owned energy company, 
after an incident in one of its nuclear power plants in Germany. The prior literature 
regards organisational legitimacy as static and unidirectional. The focus of analysis is 
on legitimacy construction at one particular point in time, for example by analysing the 
annual report following a specific crisis or controversy (e.g., Ogden and Clarke, 2005; 
Linsley and Kajüter, 2008). By contrast, we regard legitimacy as “achieved and 
maintained through social dialogue ... and reliant on organisational communication” 
2 
 
(Tregidga et al. 2007, p. 5). Thus, our analysis focuses on the discursive negotiation of 
legitimacy between management and organisational audiences over time.  
 
For this purpose, we develop an analytical framework based on Ginzel et al.’s (2004) 
concept of impression management as an interactive process between management and 
organisational audiences and Fairclough’s (1995) approach to text analysis which links 
the micro analysis of texts to macro social discourses which they reflect and help 
constitute. Fairclough (1995) regards language and society as dialectally interrelated. 
He proposes a framework incorporating three levels of analysis, namely (1) micro-level 
(text), (2) meso-level (discourse practice context incorporating text production, 
reception and adaptation), and (3) macro-level (situational, institutional and societal 
context). Legitimacy construction is located at the discourse practice level and takes the 
form of a negotiation process between senior management and organisational audiences 
(Ginzel et al., 2004).  
 
Using insights from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the focus of our analysis is on 
the way discourse is used by senior management to persuade organisational audiences 
that the organisation has adopted violated social norms and values after a legitimacy-
threatening event. Discourses are specific ways of representing a particular aspect of 
social life (Fairclough, 2003) and can thus be used to control organisational audiences’ 
impressions of the organisation (e.g., Amernic and Craig, 2007; Craig and Amernic, 
2004a, 2006, 2008; Livesey et al. 2002a, 2002b). We focus on ‘CEO-speak’ (Amernic 
and Craig, 2006, 2007), i.e., the use of discourse by CEOs in speeches, statements 
during press conferences, interviews with the media, and CEO messages in corporate 
annual reports. The words of CEOs have ‘clout’ (Amernic and Craig, 2006, p. 4) in that 
they not only shape the perceptions of stakeholders and society, but also create 
ideology, thus impacting on the way the world is run (Amernic and Craig, 2006). This 
is particularly important in times of crisis, when CEOs are expected to assume 
rhetorical leadership (Amernic and Craig, 2006), such as during legitimacy-threatening 
events. We find that CEOs use discourse strategically as a means of signalling change, 
yet maintaining the status quo. Our findings contribute to the critical research on 
corporate narrative reporting by highlighting the way discourse is used in corporate 
communication to sustain relations of domination (Milne et al., 2009). 
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1.2 Structure of the paper 
The remainder of the paper comprises of five sections. First, we discuss the concept of 
organisational legitimacy, including strategies to (re)establish organisational legitimacy 
and the role of discourse in legitimacy construction. Then, we present our analytical 
framework which consists of three levels of analysis (text, discourse practice-context 
and macro-context) aimed at capturing the interrelationship between text and context. 
Third, we describe our data and sample. Fourth, we apply our analytical framework to 
the analysis of the discursive negotiation of legitimacy between management and 
organisational audiences following an incident in a German nuclear power plant and 
discuss the limitations of our analytical framework in a broader context. Finally, in the 
conclusion, we discuss our findings and contribution to the literature. 
 
2. ORGANISATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
As legitimacy is a social construct in the sense that it is subjectively perceived and 
ascribed to an organisation’s actions and outcomes (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006), it is 
predominantly analysed from a symbolic-interpretive perspective (Hatch and Cunliffe, 
2006). The prior literature conceptualises organisational legitimacy from two different 
perspectives. Adopting an agency focus, the strategic perspective regards legitimacy as 
an operational resource which can be employed in the pursuit of organisational goals 
(Suchman, 1995; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). Adopting a structure focus, the 
institutional perspective views legitimacy as the collective awareness and recognition 
of an organisation’s practices as acceptable, appropriate, and desirable (Suchman, 
1995). From this perspective legitimacy “resides in people’s minds” (Breton and Coté, 
2006, p. 512) and is granted by organisational audiences when they perceive the 
organisation’s practices to be congruent with social rules, norms, and values. The 
perspective adopted impacts on the definition of organisational legitimacy, the 
viewpoint (either managers “looking out” or organisational audiences “looking in”, 
Suchman, 1995, p. 577), the choice of theories used, the focus of analysis, and the 
research design. The strategic perspective foregrounds the role of management in the 
construction of legitimacy by focusing on strategies adopted to restore organisational 
legitimacy after a crisis or conflict. By contrast, the institutional perspective is 
concerned with the role of organisational audiences in legitimacy construction by 
focusing on the way the organisation is portrayed in the media. See Table 1 for an 
overview of the two perspectives. 
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Table 1: Contrasting the strategic and institutional perspective on organisational legitimacy 
 
   
 Strategic perspective Institutional perspective 
   
Definition of 
legitimacy 
Managers ‘looking out’: 
Managerial attempt to demonstrate 
that organisational practices are 
congruent with society’s norms 
values, and beliefs. 
Organisational audiences ‘looking in’: 
Perception of organisational audiences that 
organisational practices  are congruent 
with social norms, values and beliefs 
   
Assumption of 
human nature 
Agency focus Structure focus 
Active:  
 Legitimacy as an organisational 
resource 
 Legitimacy is controlled by 
management 
 Legitimacy can be manipulated 
Passive: 
 Legitimacy is controlled by 
organisational audiences 
 Legitimacy can only be achieved by 
o Adhering to institutional 
practices 
o Altering institutional 
practices 
o Decoupling actual from 
reported organisational 
practices 
   
Theoretical 
approaches 
 Stakeholder theory 
 Legitimacy theory 
 Legitimacy theory 
 Institutional theory 
   
Focus of 
analysis 
 Substantive management  
 Symbolic management 
 Isomorphism 
 Decoupling 
   
Research design  Legitimacy-threatening event  Print media coverage of organisation 
 
 
Management is assumed to use corporate communication as a means of managing 
organisational legitimacy. As legitimacy is not directly observable, researchers infer 
legitimating processes and effects by focusing on events which violate social norms, 
values, and beliefs and thus pose obvious legitimacy threats to organisations, such as 
restructuring and reorganisation (Arndt and Bigelow, 2000), privatization and 
demutualization (Craig and Amernic, 2004a, 2006, 2008; Odgen and Clarke, 2005), 
environmental disasters (Hooghiemstra, 2000), and corporate scandals (e.g., Elsbach, 
1994; Craig and Amernic, 2004b; Breton and Coté, 2006; Linsley and Kajüter, 2008; 
Lightstone and Driscoll, 2008; O’Keefe and Conway, 2008). The focus of analysis is 
on the strategic use of corporate narrative documents as a means of managing 
audiences’ perceptions of the event, thus restoring legitimacy.  
 
2.1 Strategies to (re)establish legitimacy 
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Prior research has identified a variety of strategies used by management to (re)establish 
legitimacy. The strategies can be classified according to the underlying concept of 
legitimacy (i.e., either strategic or institutional) and whether they entail any real 
changes in organisational practices or values (i.e., substantive management and 
isomorphism) or, alternatively, merely manipulate audiences’ perceptions of 
organisational practices and values (i.e., symbolic management and decoupling). See 
Figure 1 for an overview. Adopting a strategic perspective, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) 
differentiate between substantive and symbolic management. Substantive management 
entails a real change in organisational processes or institutionalised practices. As 
legitimacy threats arise from an organisation failing to act in a manner which society 
considers normatively appropriate (e.g., by failing to meet society’s expectations with 
respect to product safety, animal welfare, or human rights), restoring legitimacy 
involves demonstrating that the organisation has adopted violated values. By contrast, 
symbolic management entails implementing strategies which make the organisation 
appear to respond to stakeholder concerns or appear to be congruent with society’s 
norms and expectations. Firms facing a major legitimacy threat engage in symbolic 
management by separating the negative event (e.g., fraud, scandal, or product safety 
issue) from the organisation as a whole by providing normalising accounts and by 
engaging in strategic restructuring. The purpose of normalising accounts and strategic 
restructuring is to construct a ‘firewall’ between audience assessments of the 
legitimacy-threatening event and the organisation as a whole. Normalising accounts 
entail the use of verbal remedial strategies, such as excuses, apologies, and 
justifications. Strategic restructuring entails “selectively confess[ing] that limited 
aspects of its operations were flawed” (Suchman, 199, p. 598) and then decisively and 
visibly remedying them by introducing small and narrowly tailored changes. Two types 
of strategic restructuring have been identified by the prior literature, namely (1) creating 
monitors and watchdogs and (2) disassociation. Disassociation entails symbolically 
distancing the organisation from negative influences. For example, executive 
replacement allows the organisation to dissociate itself from a legitimacy-threatening 
event by putting the blame on individual members of the organisation. Organisations 
can also dissociate themselves from de-legitimated procedures and structures.  
Adopting an institutional perspective, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that 
organisations respond to social and institutional pressures and expectations by means 
of either isomorphism or decoupling. Depending on the nature of the legitimacy-
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threatening event, management may respond by either altering organisational structures 
and processes so that they are in line with social and institutional norms and rules or by 
emphasising institutional conformity (isomorphism). Alternatively, organisational 
structures and processes may just appear to conform to social and institutional norms 
and rules. This constitutes decoupling.  
 
 
 
Symbolic management and decoupling constitute impression management in the sense 
that they entail shaping an audience’s impression of a person, an object, an event, or an 
idea (Schlenker, 1980). The concept of impression management originates in social 
psychology and can be traced back to the work of Goffman (1959). Using a 
dramaturgical metaphor, Goffman (1959) explains impression management as the 
performance of self vis-à-vis an audience. Impression management is used to establish, 
maintain, or repair organisational legitimacy by influencing organisational audiences’ 
impressions of organisational outcomes or events so that they are perceived to be 
congruent with social norms, values, and beliefs (see, for example, Elsbach, 1994; 
Hooghiemstra, 2000; Breton and Coté, 2006; Linsley and Kajüter, 2008). We argue that 
management may use impression management to restore organisational legitimacy after 
a crisis or controversy by persuading organisational audiences that the organisation has 
adopted violated social norms and values (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2011).  
Symbolic 
management 
Substantive 
management 
Norma
lising 
accoun
t 
Strateg
ic  
Restru
cturing 
Strategic perspective Institutional 
perspective 
Altering 
socially 
institution
alised 
practices 
Strategies to 
(re)establish 
legitimacy 
Figure 1: Strategies to (re)establish organisational 
legitimacy 
Isomorphi
sm 
Decoupl
ing 
Change 
organisati
onal 
practices 
Adopt 
violate
d 
values 
Impression Management 
Key: Shaded boxes indicate impression 
management strategies 
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2.2 The role of discourse in legitimacy construction 
We draw on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) for insights on the role of discourse in 
legitimacy construction. CDA is a form of social research focusing on language which 
is regarded as dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life 
(Fairclough, 2003). Focusing on the dialectic relationship between language and 
society, CDA addresses how the content and the linguistic features of texts influence 
and are, in turn, influenced by the contexts of text production, distribution, reception 
and adaptation, and by the wider socio-economic context in which texts are embedded. 
CDA is critical in the sense that it studies “the way social power abuse, dominance, and 
inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text … in the social and political 
context” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 253). Discourses are specific ways of construing particular 
aspects of social life (e.g., different discourses on immigration or on climate change) 
which can be identified with different perspectives of various groups of social actors 
(Fairclough, 2009). Discourses thus represent particular perspectives on the social 
world and can be differentiated by specific stances expressed by a group of people who 
share specific beliefs and values. As legitimacy is a function of the organisation acting 
according to the norms, values, and beliefs of society, the adoption of violated values 
constitutes a crucial strategy for restoring organisational legitimacy.  
 
The prior accounting literature focuses on the strategic use of specific discourses (e.g., 
the economic discourse of efficiency and effectiveness) to convince organisational 
audiences of the legitimacy, necessity, and validity of potentially controversial actions 
and decisions, such as privatisation (Craig and Amernic, 2004b, 2006, 2008). 
Discourses constitute part of the resources people use to relate to one another, i.e., either 
keeping separate from one another, cooperating or competing with one another, or 
dominating one another (Fairclough, 2003, p. 124). They may thus be deployed 
strategically to redefine an organisation’s relationship with its stakeholders during a 
public controversy or crisis. We focus on the strategic use of discourse as a means of 
resolving a conflict between the organisation and its audiences by means of signalling 
that it has realigned its norms and values with that of society. This constitutes an ethical 
issue as it entails influencing organisational audiences’ ideas and managing their 
perceptions as a means of manufacturing their consent. 
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3. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
We adopt an abductive approach. This entails developing our analytical framework and 
categories of text analysis in accordance with our research questions by means of 
“oscillating between theory and data analysis in retroductive ways” (Wodak and Meyer, 
2009, p. 19).  Our analytical framework is based on Fairclough (1995, 2003) and 
consists of the three levels of analysis (text, discourse practice-context and macro-
context) which capture the interrelationship between text and context. The analytical 
categories relevant for text analysis emerge during an iterative process of going back 
and forth between the theoretical concepts developed in Sections 2 and 3 of the paper 
and the empirical data described in Section 4.2.  
 
3.1 Levels of analysis: Text and context 
Fairclough (1995, 2003) regards the roles, relations and identities of discourse 
participants within a discourse community to be constituted and negotiated by means 
of spoken and written texts. As such, texts are embedded in wider socio-economic and 
political contexts. His analytical framework addresses how the content and the 
linguistic features of texts influence, and are, in turn influenced, by the contexts of text 
production, distribution, reception and adaptation, and by the wider socio-economic 
context in which texts are embedded (Fairclough, 1995, 2003). Fairclough (1995) 
operationalises this dialectic relationship between language and society in a framework 
consisting of three levels of analysis, namely (1) the text itself (micro-level), (2) the 
context of producing, distributing, receiving and possibly adapting texts within a 
discourse community (meso-level), and (3) the dynamic socio-economic and political 
context in which the discourse community can be located (macro-level). In this 
framework corporate communication can be regarded as a micro-process through which 
management aims to “control the way in which the corporate story is interpreted” 
(Crowther et al., 2006, p. 199). The three interrelated levels of analysis, including our 
analytical categories, are illustrated in Figure 2. 
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(1)Text:
Management’s 
accounts
Management
Organisational audiences
Micro-level analysis: 
Managerial discourse 
(metaphors and differentiation)
Meso-level analysis: Interaction 
between management and 
organisational audiences
Figure 2: Levels of analysis: Text and context
(2) Discourse Practice Context:
Macro-level analysis:
social context(3) Macro-Context:
Key: Adapted from Fairclough, 1995 and Ginzel et al., 2004. Shaded boxes refer to factors impacting on legitimacy construction. 
(a) Legitimacy-threatening event:
Anticipated vs. unanticipated;
Arising from failure to comply with 
audience expectations regarding 
performance vs. values
(c) Organisation’s stance towards audiences: 
Instrumental vs. normative stakeholder orientation
(b) Perceptions managers and 
audiences have of the event:
Congruent vs. incongruent
 
3.2 Macro-level analysis 
Macro-level analysis involves taking the wider social formation into account to 
interpret the findings of the text analysis. The aim of the analysis is to explain why 
social actors, events and organisations are represented and arguments are constructed 
in a specific way. Depending on the text(s) in question, the focus may be on historical, 
economic, political, or cultural formations or on a combination of them. The focus of 
analysis is on details of the social formation (e.g., the roles allocated to people), and on 
changes in the social formation and reasons for these changes. In our case, the macro-
context is concerned with the legitimacy of the nuclear industry in Germany. 
 
3.3 Meso-level analysis 
Meso-level analysis explains the reasons for the presence of specific discourses in the 
texts under investigation by recourse to the discourse practice context which includes 
the production, distribution, reception and possible adaptation of texts. An analysis of 
the discourse practice context focuses on the roles of members of a discourse 
community and the relationships between them. In the case of corporate narrative 
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documents this entails analysing the relationship between managers and stakeholders, 
including regulatory agencies, politicians, and intermediaries, such as the media. Both 
for text producers and recipients discourse practice also involves issues of unequal 
discourse access due to asymmetrical power between participants.  
 
As we conceptualise legitimacy as being discursively constructed in the interaction 
between management and organisational audiences over time (Ginzel et al., 2004), it is 
part of the discourse practice context. Figure 2 illustrates the factors impacting on 
legitimacy construction. The negotiation of legitimacy consists of at least three phases, 
namely (i) the account generation process during which management provides an 
interpretation of an event, (ii) the reaction of organizational audiences to management’s 
interpretation of the event, and (iii) a subsequent account generation process during 
which management attempts to negotiate a resolution between its initial account and 
the interpretation by organizational audiences. The negotiation process constitutes a 
struggle over meaning with both parties aiming to have their definition of reality 
accepted (Suchman, 1995, p. 597).  
 
A legitimacy-threatening event prompts management to provide an account which 
constitutes management’s interpretation of an event. Accounts are verbal explanations 
or “‘verbal remedial strategies’ that ‘provide explanations for problematic behaviours 
designed to rectify a predicament’” (Gonzales et al., 1990, p. 610; cited in Ginzel et al. 
2004, p. 231).  For this purpose, management may engage in impression management 
in order to influence organisational audiences’ perceptions of the event. A managerial 
account may be in the form of a press release, a CEO statement during a press 
conference, or a media interview with a company executive. Depending on whether 
management’s and organisational audiences’ interpretations of the event are congruent 
or incongruent, the initial managerial account is either accepted or rejected. If it is 
rejected, management provides a subsequent account which aims to resolve the 
conflicting interpretations of the event, thus restoring organisational legitimacy.  
 
We regard the interaction between management and organisational audiences as 
determined by a variety of factors, including (a) the nature of the legitimacy-threatening 
event (i.e., anticipated/unanticipated and arising from managerial failure to comply 
with audience expectations regarding performance/values), (b) the perceptions 
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management and organisational audiences have of the event (i.e., 
congruent/incongruent), and (c) the organisation’s stance towards its audiences (i.e., 
instrumental/normative stakeholder orientation). The legitimacy-threatening event can 
be either anticipated or unanticipated. Unanticipated events “are especially difficult for 
top managers to cope with when they immediately place the organization’s image or 
reputation in doubt” (Ginzel et al., 2004, p. 227). Elsbach (2001, p. 405) argues that 
legitimacy threats caused by unanticipated events can be successfully restored by using 
“technical and logical arguments and … communicated through technical jargon”. By 
contrast, legitimacy threats caused by anticipated events can be successfully restored 
by taking the views of organisational audiences into consideration “backed up by 
references to widely accepted social norms … communicated through common 
language” (Elsbach, 2000, p. 405). Legitimacy-threatening events either arise from the 
organisation’s failure to comply with audience expectations of organisational 
performance or involve a violation of values (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Performance-
related legitimacy threats are due to the organisation’s failure to meet its goals (e.g., 
through poor service), whereas value-related legitimacy threats call the organisation’s 
mission and thus its essence into question.  
 
The stance adopted by the organisation towards its stakeholders impacts on strategies 
chosen by management to restore legitimacy. The literature suggests that organisations 
either adopt an instrumental or a normative stance towards their stakeholders. An 
instrumental stakeholder orientation regards stakeholders as a means an end, i.e., to 
create economic (shareholder) value. By contrast, a normative stakeholder orientation 
recognises stakeholders as means in themselves and aims to achieve social and 
environmental, as well as economic value. An organisation’s stance towards its 
stakeholders impacts on five aspects of corporate social responsibility, namely (1) 
organisational purpose, (2) stakeholder identification and salience, (3) stakeholder 
management, (4) performance metrics, and (5) the boundary between the organisation 
and its stakeholders (O’Higgins, 2010). Organisational purpose relates to the way the 
organisation conceives of its purpose, i.e., for whose benefit the organisation exists and 
the role (if any) of stakeholders in achieving this purpose. Stakeholder identification 
and salience refer to the different criteria employed for deciding who is a stakeholder 
and their importance in achieving the organisational purpose. Stakeholder management 
relates to the different approaches adopted towards strategic analysis with respect to 
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stakeholders. Performance metrics refer to the performance measures used to assess 
organisational success in performance according to the organisation’ purpose and 
stakeholder management practices. Finally, the boundary between the organisation and 
its stakeholder relates to how the organisation defines itself in relation to its 
environment (O’Higgins, 2010). 
 
3.4 Micro-level analysis 
Micro-level text analysis focuses on the specific linguistic features which are of 
particular importance for the text(s) under investigation. These are dependent on the 
research objective, the genre of the text(s), and the audience it is aimed at. We focus on 
the discourses used by Vattenfall’s CEOs (‘CEO-speak’) to construct organisational 
legitimacy after an incident in one of their nuclear power plants in Germany. This 
entails identifying the aspect of the social world (theme or topic) represented in the 
text(s) under investigation and the particular point of view (perspective) from which it 
is represented (Fairclough, 2003). The most obvious distinguishing feature of 
discourses is vocabulary, as discourses lexicalise and thus structure the social world in 
particular ways. Discourses thus manifest themselves in keywords, metaphors and 
differentiation (i.e., binary opposites) (Fairclough, 2003). Metaphors entail 
“understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980, p. 5). They are resources for producing distinct representations of the 
world. Conversely, the particular combination of different metaphors differentiates 
discourses (Fairclough, 2003). Differentiation refers to the fact that people understand 
the world in terms of significant pairings, contrasts, or dualities, such as up-down, 
mind-body, public-private, etc. which are often seen “in contradiction to each other, 
frequently with one term assuming dominance” (Llewellyn, 2003, p. 670). 
Differentiation and metaphor are used to set up specific value systems and associated 
assumptions (Fairclough, 2003). Table 2 summarises the two dimensions of discourses 
and corresponding semantic and rhetorical devices. 
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Table 2: Elements of discourse 
   
   
Dimensions of discourses Definition of dimensions Semantic & rhetorical devices 
a. Aspect of the social world Theme/topic  
(e.g., immigration) 
Keywords (e.g., foreigners, 
asylum seekers) 
b. Particular point of view Perspective (e.g., right-wing) Metaphors, differentiation (e.g., 
overrun, hard-working families 
vs. illegal immigrants) 
   
 
Text analysis entails first identifying the keywords which are indicative of the themes 
or topics represented in the text and then the metaphors and binary opposites which 
signify the particular stance adopted by the author either towards the content or the 
readers of the text (Hyland, 1998). The predominance of keywords, such as 
‘stakeholders’ (e.g., documents 4 and 6), ‘the general public’ (e.g., documents 2, 4, and 
9), and ‘customers’ (e.g., documents 3, 4, and 8) suggests that the predominant theme 
of all nine CEO texts is Vattenfall’s stance towards its organisational audiences. Thus, 
the focus of analysis is on the discourse of stakeholder orientation. We compare the 
metaphors and differentiation used by Vattenfall’s CEOs in their initial and subsequent 
accounts of the incident at the Krümmel nuclear power plant. We find the initial account 
to be characterised by metaphors and differentiation associated with technocratic 
discourse emphasising facts and figures and rule compliance. By contrast, subsequent 
accounts are characterised by metaphors and differentiation indicative of the discourse 
of stakeholder engagement. Technocratic discourse draws on scientific and 
technological discourse and shares lexical features with managerialism and the military 
(McKenna and Graham, 2000). By claiming rational objectivity and promoting action 
based on reason and fact, technocratic discourse communicates instrumental rationality 
(Elsbach, 2001). Instrumental rationality is a rationality of means which involves 
“applying appropriate reason to choose the best possible means to attain one’s ends” 
(Tomer, 2008, p. 1704). By contrast, the discourse of stakeholder engagement 
emphasises dialogue, understanding, and sharing. It promotes action based on emotion 
(Greenwood, 2007) and communicates understanding and consideration of 
stakeholders’ views (Elsbach, 2001). This involves substantive rationality.  Substantive 
rationality is concerned with ideals, goals and ends which are pursued for their own 
sake, such as equality, justice, freedom, respect for the environment (Weber, 1968). 
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Substantive rationality is a rationality of ends which involves applying appropriate 
reason to achieve these ends.  
 
The technocratic discourse and the discourse of stakeholder engagement are thus 
diametrically opposed to each other in terms of the stance adopted by the organisation 
towards its stakeholders (i.e., instrumental versus normative stakeholder orientation), 
which, in turn, is due to their different underlying concepts of rationality (i.e., 
instrumental vs. substantive). The technocratic discourse and the discourse of 
stakeholder engagement (perspectives) are juxtaposed by means of a series of 
metaphors and significant pairings which relate to the five aspects of corporate social 
responsibility (sub-themes) outlined in Section 3.3, namely (1) organisational purpose, 
(2) stakeholder identification and salience, (3) stakeholder management, (4) 
performance metrics, and (5) the boundary between the organisation and its 
stakeholders (see Figure 3). The metaphors and differentiation associated with each of 
the five aspects of corporate social responsibility are drawn from the nine CEO texts 
which form the basis of our micro-level analysis. Appendix 1 illustrates the empirical 
application of our categories of analysis by means of quotes. 
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Figure 3: Micro-level analysis: Analysing the managerial discourse in Vattenfall’s CEO texts
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4. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
We analyse the attempt by Vattenfall, a Swedish state-owned energy company, to 
restore organisational legitimacy after an incident in Krümmel, one of its nuclear power 
plants in Germany. Krümmel is jointly operated by Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy 
GmbH (an associated company of Vattenfall Europe AG, the German subsidiary of the 
Swedish parent company, Vattenfall AB) and E.ON.  
 
4.1 Data 
We collect all corporate narrative documents relating to the incident issued during a 
six-month period between the incident and the financial year-end on 31st December 
2007.1 We use the keyword ‘Krümmel’ and the specified time period to search the news 
archives of web pages of the parent company, Vattenfall AB (vattenfall.com), and the 
German subsidiary, Vattenfall Europe AG (vattenfall.de). We identify 29 documents. 
They include press releases, interim reports, the annual report, the social corporate 
                                                          
1 The financial year-end is on 31 December 2007. The annual report and the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report are published on 28 March 2008 and are included in our analysis. 
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responsibility report, statements and speeches by company executives during press 
conferences, and a media interview. The documents are either in English or in German. 
Some English-language documents are word-for-word translations of German 
documents. When the German-language and English language documents are 
congruent, the English version is used. German documents without English-language 
equivalents are translated by the authors. 
 
4.2 Sample selection 
Our sample consists of nine CEO texts which are either ‘authored’ by the CEO of 
Vattenfall’s German subsidiary (Vattenfall Europe AG) or by the CEO of the Swedish 
parent company (Vattenfall AB) during the period of observation.2 The remaining 
documents are used for the meso-level analysis to provide insights on the interaction 
between management and organisational audiences. In the micro-level analysis we 
focus on ‘CEO-speak’ in the initial and subsequent accounts of the incident (i.e., the 
discourses used by Vattenfall’s CEOs). As ‘the social face of the organisation’ (Brennan 
and Conroy, 2010, p. 7) the CEO is the organisational actor primarily in charge of 
legitimacy construction. By directly interacting with organisational audiences, 
particularly the media, and by means of press conferences and interviews, the CEO 
controls the way organisational actions and outcomes are interpreted. CEOs choose 
their words carefully and deliberately, with strategic purposes in mind (Amernic and 
Craig, 2006).  
  
Table 3 lists the nine CEO texts which make up our sample by date, type of document, 
‘author’, and source, including source language, and approximate length. The sample 
comprises one document by Klaus Rauscher, the CEO of Vattenfall Europe AG, the 
German subsidiary, at the time of the incident, two documents by Hans-Jürgen 
Crammer, who replaced Klaus Rauscher as the CEO of the German subsidiary on 18 
July 2007, five documents by Lars G. Josefsson, the CEO of Vattenfall AB, the Swedish 
                                                          
2 The nine CEO texts are ‘authored by four different CEOs. Goffman (1981) differentiates between (1) 
the principal, whose position the text reflects, (2) the author, who performs the writing task, and (3) the 
animator, who articulates the text. In our case, it is difficult to know whether Vattenfall’s CEOs are 
authors in the Goffmanian (1981) sense. However, they can be considered both principals and animators 
of the texts under investigation. However, discourses, which are the focus of analysis in this paper, 
represent aspects of the social world from a particular perspective and are thus concerned with the views 
of the principal, rather than that of the author or animator. 
 
5 
 
parent company, and one document by Per-Olof Waessman, Vattenfall AB’s Chief 
Nuclear Officer. The first document by Klaus Rauscher constitutes the initial account 
provided by a CEO. It is a reinforcement of the initial account provided by management 
by means of press releases (see Figure 5). The remaining eight texts are subsequent 
accounts during which CEOs aim to negotiate a resolution between their initial account 
and incongruent interpretations by organisational audiences.  
 
   
Table 3: Overview of Vattenfall’s CEO texts 
   
    
 Date Document 
 
Type of 
document 
‘Author' Source, 
language, and 
length 
      
Initial 
account 
10/07/07 1 Statement during 
press conference 
Klaus Rauscher, 
CEO of German 
subsidiary 
Company 
website, German 
(translated by 
authors), 1 page 
 
 
 
 
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
11.  
12.  
13.  
14.  
15. Subsequent 
accounts 
18/07/07 2 Statement 
regarding Klaus 
Rauscher’s 
resignation 
Lars G. Josefsson, 
CEO of Swedish 
Parent 
Company 
website, German 
(translated by 
authors), 1 ½ 
pages 
23/07/07 3 Interview by 
German news 
magazine Der 
Spiegel 
Lars G. Josefsson, 
CEO of Swedish 
parent 
Der Spiegel 
website, English, 
4 pages 
27/07/07 4 Statement 
regarding Q2 
Group interim 
results 
Lars G. Josefsson, 
CEO of Swedish 
parent 
Company 
website, English, 
1 page 
09/08/07 5 Presentation at 
AGM of German 
subsidiary 
Hans-Jürgen 
Crammer, CEO of 
German 
subsidiary 
Company 
website, German 
(translated by 
authors), 9 ½ 
pages 
24/09/07 6 Presentation at 
Capital Markets 
Day in Stockholm 
Hans-Jürgen 
Crammer, CEO of 
German 
subsidiary 
Company 
website, English, 
video footage 
(transcribed by 
authors), 1 ½ 
pages 
01/11/07 7 Statement  
regarding Q3 
Group interim 
results 
Lars G. Josefsson, 
CEO of Swedish 
parent 
Company 
website, English, 
¾ page 
 28/03/08 8 CEO’s message in 
Annual Report  
Lars G. Josefsson, 
CEO of Swedish 
parent 
Company 
website, English, 
4 ½ pages 
 28/03/08 9 Message by Chief 
Nuclear Officer in 
CSR 
Per-Olof 
Waessman, Chief 
Nuclear Officer of 
Swedish parent 
Company 
website, English 2 
pages 
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5. FINDINGS 
We apply the analytical framework and the categories of analysis developed in Section 
3 to analyse the negotiation of organisational legitimacy between Vattenfall’s CEOs and 
organisational audiences following an incident in the Krümmel nuclear power plant.  
 
5.1 Background information 
Vattenfall, a Swedish state-owned energy company, has been operating in Germany 
since 2002 when Germany liberalised its energy market (Schulz and Wehmeier, 2010). 
Vattenfall runs three of the seventeen nuclear power plants in Germany, namely 
Brunsbüttel, Krümmel, and Brokdorf. Krümmel is situated on the river Elbe, 30km 
south-east of Hamburg in the Federal Land of Schleswig-Holstein. It has been 
generating nuclear power since 1983. On the 28th of June 2007 a fire broke out in a 
transformer building in Krümmel. The plant was shut down automatically and the 
incident was rated zero on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) which 
constitutes an event without safety significance.3 However, it resulted in a public 
controversy regarding the nuclear safety of Krümmel and the future of nuclear power 
in Germany.  At the time of the incident Krümmel had a remaining lifespan of ten years. 
 
5.2 Macro-level analysis 
Nuclear energy is a contentious issue in Germany (Roose, 2010). The German anti-
nuclear movement originates in the late 1960s when the first nuclear power plants were 
constructed to meet increasing demand for cheap energy. The initial opposition to 
nuclear power was due to its association with nuclear weapons during the Cold War 
era. There were few anti-nuclear protests in the 1960s. The anti-nuclear movement 
gained strength over time, with the number of demonstrations and number of people 
taking part rising throughout the 1970s and 1980s. It reached its peak in 1986 as a result 
of the nuclear incident at the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. By then, the 
                                                          
3 INES was introduced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1990s. It is used for 
facilitating fast communication to the media and the public regarding the safety significance of events at 
any nuclear installation associated with the civil nuclear industry, including events involving the use of 
radiation sources and the transport of radioactive materials. Events are classified on the scale at seven 
levels. Events without safety significance are classified below scale at level 0. For comparison, the 
accident at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was rated 5 on the INES scale and Chernobyl 
was rated 7 on the INES scale (Borglin et al., 2008). 
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anti-nuclear movement had gained political power due its sheer size, and protests often 
involved clashes between the protesters and the police. After decreasing protests in the 
early 1990s, the anti-nuclear movement was mobilised again in the late 1990s by the 
issue of the transportation and storage of nuclear waste. The coalition government of 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Alliance ‘90/The Greens that was formed 
in the 1998 election represented a turning point in the nuclear debate in Germany, 
because it was in favour of a nuclear phase-out. In 2002, following a long-drawn out 
political debate and lengthy negotiations between the Government and nuclear power 
operators, the German Parliament passed an Act on the structured phase-out of nuclear 
power by 2021. In 2007, after a change of government, politicians from the 
conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), including Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
argued for a delay of the nuclear phase out due to growing concerns about the reliability 
of Russian energy supplies to Western Europe (Deutsche Welle). The incident in 
Krümmel thus occurred at a political turning point with regarding the future of nuclear 
power in Germany. It refuelled the public debate on the safety of nuclear power, with 
environmental organisations demanding a quick nuclear phase-out across Germany 
(General-Anzeiger, 2007, June 30). Angela Merkel took position in this debate by 
making the following statement: 
 
I am of the opinion that for safe nuclear reactors the limits imposed on their operating lives is a 
problem. But the prerequisite is, of course, that there is trust. And that everything demanded by 
the regulations is complied with (Der Spiegel, 2007, July 11). 
 
Three days after the incident approximately one hundred protestors assembled at 
Krümmel to demand the plant’s shut-down. What is more, Greenpeace, one of 
Vattenfall’s harshest critics, stationed its boat ‘Beluga II’ on the river Elbe close to the 
plant (Die Welt, 2007, July 2).4 
 
The anti-nuclear movement has broad public support in Germany. In 1978/79, twelve 
percent of the population opposed nuclear power (Roose, 2010). In 1996, this number 
rose to over 40 percent. In 2006 an opinion poll carried out by the German Forsa 
                                                          
4 On its German website Greenpeace aims to expose Vattenfall’s campaign entitled ‘Klimaunterschrift’ 
(signatures for the environment) as greenwashing. Vattenfall launches this campaign in 2007 in the 
aftermath of the incident at Krümmel as a means of restoring organisational legitimacy. Vattenfall 
portrays the campaign as a change in structures and processes and institutional conformity in terms of 
social and environmental responsibility (isomorphism), whereas Greenpeace argues that it constitutes 
espousing socially acceptable goals (decoupling). 
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Institute for the Ministry of Environment found 71 percent of the population perceive 
nuclear energy to be an unacceptable risk and 51 percent regard nuclear energy as a 
high or very high risk (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit, 2006). This suggests that an incident in a German nuclear power 
plant constitutes a legitimacy-threatening event.  
 
Vattenfall’s legitimacy was already damaged due to prior incidents in other nuclear 
power plants both in Germany and in Sweden. The incident in Krümmel resulted in 
heavy criticism of Vattenfall’s management by the German media, politicians, and 
environmental groups, thus further damaging its legitimacy. The incident also triggered 
an intense political debate on the future of nuclear power in Germany, with the centre-
left Social Democratic Party (SPD) arguing for an acceleration of the phase-out of 
nuclear power and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) arguing against 
it (Berliner Zeitung, 2007, June 30). Thus, the incident threatened the survival of the 
entire nuclear energy industry in Germany. Figure 4 provides an overview of events. 
28/06/07 Fire breaks out in transformer building at Krümmel nuclear power station near Hamburg.
30/06/07 Greenpeace stages protest with ship Beluga II on Elbe in front of Krümmel.
03/07/07 Supervisory authority informs public of abnormalities during the shutdown at Krümmel.
04/07/07 Greenpeace criticises Vattenfall and authority for poor provision of information.
05/07/07 Supervisory authority criticises Vattenfall for poor provision of information.
10/07/07 Chancellor Merkel demands quick and proper investigation; Environment Minister Gabriel 
accuses Vattenfall of hindering the inspection works.
16/07/07 Supervisory authority criticises communication processes at Krümmel; Bruno Thomauske, 
Head of Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy, is dismissed and Johannes Altmeppen, Head of 
Corporate Communication at Vattenfall Europe AG, resigns.
18/07/07 Head of Vattenfall Europe AG Klaus Rauscher resigns and is replaced by Hans Jürgen
Crammer
27/07/07 Independent expert commission takes up investigation at Krümmel.
07/08/07 Start of Vattenfall Europe AG’s dialogue campaign in major German newspapers.
06/11/07 Independent expert commission publishes final report on investigation.
31/12/07 End of period under observation; financial year end.
Figure 4: Key events
Legitimacy threat 2: 
Confidence crisis: 
Violation of values 
(non-disclosure of 
information)
Legitimacy threat 1:
Safety crisis: 
Violation of performance 
(technical problem)
 
5.3 Meso-level analysis 
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The incident in the Krümmel power plant constitutes a legitimacy-threatening, 
unanticipated event. Due to the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Germany, there is a 
climate of mutual mistrust between nuclear power companies and the German public. 
Vattenfall’s management reacts to the legitimacy-threat posed by the incident by 
“provid[ing] as little information as possible, admit[ting] only what can no longer be 
denied and downplay[ing] the facts” (Bartsch et al., 2007). Management only issues a 
brief ‘matter of fact’ press release on the day of the incident (Vattenfall, 2007, 28 June) 
and waits three days to provide an account aimed at restoring legitimacy by means of 
portraying the fire as an isolated incident with no safety implications. It lends credence 
to its claim by quoting a statement issued by the regulatory authority, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, stating that the incident poses no danger to the 
population or the natural environment (Vattenfall, 2007, 1 July).  Due to Vattenfall’s 
prior poor track record regarding incidents and strong anti-nuclear sentiment in 
Germany, organisational audiences are antagonistic and have an incongruent view of 
the incident. Confronted with black smoke billowing out from the nuclear power plant, 
the incident at Krümmel sparks a fierce debate on the nuclear safety of all German 
nuclear power plants. The German news magazine Der Spiegel attributes the strong 
public reaction to the incident in Krümmel to its high visibility: 
 
Whereas most of the 130 reactor incidents reported annually in Germany are minor and go 
unnoticed, smoke pouring out of a transformer as happened in Krümmel tends to attract 
attention” (Bartsch et al., 2007).  
  
The incongruent interpretations of the incident by management and organisational 
audiences increase the conflict between Vattenfall and the public. The legitimacy crisis 
intensifies five days after the incident, on 3rd July 2007, when the supervisory authority 
releases information relating to abnormalities during the shutdown of the plant (TAZ, 
2007, July 4). As management failed to inform the public of these abnormalities in their 
initial account of the incident, the company faces severe criticism from politicians, 
environmental organisations, and the media.  This results in Vattenfall experiencing 
two legitimacy threats, the first relating to the safety crisis involving a violation of 
performance standards (due to a technical problem resulting in the incident) and the 
second relating to the confidence crisis involving a violation of values (due to the non-
disclosure of information) (see Figure 4). Vattenfall attempts to solve both crises by 
replacing the company executives responsible for nuclear safety and for corporate 
10 
 
communication, namely Bruno Thomauske, Head of Vattenfall Europe Nuclear 
Energy, and Johannes Altmeppen, Vattenfall Europe AG’s Head of Communication 
(Der Spiegel, 2007, 16 July). Executive replacement constitutes symbolic management 
in the form of dissociation. However, the reaction of Michael Müller, Germany’s 
Minister of the Environment, suggests that organisational audiences see through 
Vattenfall’s attempt to distance itself from both legitimacy-threatening events by 
putting the blame on individual members of the organisation: 
 
That is the normal reaction, to sacrifice someone … But this isn’t just about switching personnel. 
… Most important is reforming concepts. And in that regard I would like to hear a lot more 
from Vattenfall (Der Spiegel, 2007, 16 July). 
 
 
The ensuing decline in public trust results in the loss of 250,000 customers in a six 
month period following the incident (Tagesspiegel, 2007, December 10). 
 
5.4 Micro-level analysis 
The statement issued by Klaus Rauscher, the CEO of Vattenfall Europe AG, during a 
press conference twelve days after the incident constitutes the first CEO account of the 
incident (document 1). The statement is characterised by technocratic discourse. Klaus 
Rauscher aims to restore organisational legitimacy by means of using facts and figures 
as a means of convincing organisational audiences of the insignificance of the incident. 
Despite being aware that Vattenfall faces two legitimacy threats, the first caused by the 
incident and involving the violation of performance standards and the second caused 
by management’s inadequate disclosure and involving the violation of values, Klaus 
Rauscher nevertheless uses technocratic discourse which emphasises rationality, rather 
than emotion, to describe the incident and Vattenfall’s responses to it. 
The supervisory authority was informed in a prompt and comprehensive manner. This has been 
explicitly confirmed by the nuclear inspectorate. People inside the plant or in the proximity of 
the plant were not at risk at any point in time. This has also been confirmed by the supervisory 
authority. (document 1). 
 
By emphasising fact and figures and rule compliance, his statement constitutes a 
reinforcement of management’s initial account of the incident (see Figure 5). His use 
of technocratic discourse alienates the German public further, particularly powerful 
green and left-wing stakeholder groups, such as Greenpeace. What is more, Klaus 
Rauscher’s depiction of the relationship between Vattenfall and organisational 
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stakeholders as warring parties, with Vattenfall in the role of the victim and 
organisational audiences in the role of the aggressor, increases the conflict between 
Vattenfall and organisational audiences.  
 
We are currently being attacked by people from a political persuasion who are against the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Opponents of nuclear energy are undoubtedly using the 
incidents in Brunsbüttel and Krümmel to their advantage. (document 1) 
 
His statement provides an “unintentionally revealing picture” (Amernic and Craig, 
2007, p. 25) of Vattenfall’s view of stakeholders as “threats … to be dealt with in the 
same way as any other pressures” (O’Higgins, 2010, p. 163). The technocratic discourse 
used in his statement intensifies the crisis, resulting in his resignation eight days later 
(Der Spiegel, 2007, 18 July). This finding is in contrast to Elsbach’s (2001) assumption 
that technical arguments communicated through technical jargon constitute the best 
way to restore legitimacy during unexpected legitimacy-threatening events.  
 
Lars G. Josefsson, the CEO of the parent company Vattenfall AB, issues a statement 
on 18th July 2007 in response to Klaus Rauscher’s resignation in order to alleviate the 
crisis. He provides a negotiated account which takes organisational audiences’ views 
into consideration (document 2). This is framed within the discourse of stakeholder 
engagement. Emphasising understanding and consideration, he aims to re-align 
Vattenfall’s norms and values with that of society in order to restore the firm’s badly 
damaged legitimacy.  
 
A company restricting its disclosures to statement of a purely technical nature stressing the lack 
of safety implications of the incident has not taken its social responsibility seriously enough. 
Any organisation which runs highly technically complex operations such as nuclear power 
plants is not only accountable to the regulatory body, but also to the public whose trust and 
approval needs to be won means of dialogue. We have a special responsibility in this respect. 
(document 2) 
 
Lars Josefsson frames his account as a ‘new start’. He uses the discourse of stakeholder 
engagement as a means of constructing a “future desired image” (Abrahamsson et al., 
2011) of the firm which is characterised by openness, transparency and dialogic 
communication with stakeholders. In fact, in his CEO message of the 2007 annual 
report he directly refers to the process of image construction when he says that ‘[we 
aim] to get our customers to perceive us as being a progressive, empathetic, easily 
accessible and reliable partner’ (document 8). This entails changing Vattenfall’s 
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approach to corporate social responsibility by means of redefining organisational 
purpose, changing the way it identifies and manages its stakeholders, changing its 
performance metrics, and redefining the boundary between the organisation and its 
stakeholders. In stressing the tie between the German subsidiary and the Vattenfall 
Group Lars Josefsson attempts to transfer the slightly better image of the Group to its 
German subsidiary. This goes hand in hand with a dialogue campaign involving the 
placement of advertisements in German newspapers in order to demonstrate 
Vattenfall’s willingness to engage in dialogue with organisational audiences.  
 
Figure 5 outlines the interaction between Vattenfall’s CEOs and organisational 
audiences during the process of reciprocal sense-making following the incident at 
Krümmel.  
Figure 5: The negotiation of legitimacy between Vattenfall and its organisational audiences
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The eight CEO texts which constitute negotiated accounts of the incident (i.e., 
documents 2 to 9) are characterised by a high level of intertextuality, i.e., the presence 
of elements of other texts within a text (Fairclough, 2003). Intertextuality entails 
references to the same topic or event, either by reproducing the actual words or by 
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providing a summary. This manifests itself by the recurrence of the same key words 
and metaphors (i.e., ‘trust’, ‘dialogue’, ‘learning the language of the customers’).  The 
high level of intertextuality in eight CEO texts over a six-month period suggests that 
the discourse of stakeholder engagement serves as a means of bringing Vattenfall’s 
communication in line with institutional norms which stress openness, transparency, 
and corporate social responsibility.  
 
Using the categories of text analysis developed in Section 3.4 we contrast the 
technocratic discourse used by Klaus Rauscher in his initial account of the incident with 
the discourse of stakeholder engagement used in subsequent CEO accounts. The 
discourses constitute opposing perspectives with respect to the organisation’s stance 
towards its stakeholders (i.e., instrumental vs. normative) and manifest themselves in 
metaphors and binary opposites relating to the five aspects of corporate social 
responsibility identified by O’Higgins (2010), namely (1) organisational purpose, (2) 
stakeholder identification and salience, (3) stakeholder management, (4) performance 
metrics, and (5) the boundary between the organisation and its stakeholders. See 
Appendix 1 for an empirical illustration of the technocratic discourse and the discourse 
of stakeholder engagement in the nine CEO texts under investigation. 
 
(1) Organisational purpose (obligation vs. trust) 
In the initial account of the incident Klaus Rauscher regards information disclosure as 
a legal obligation towards the regulatory authority, rather than a duty to the general 
public. This is indicative of a sceptical stakeholder orientation characterised by a lack 
of recognition of stakeholders per se (O’Higgins, 2010). In subsequent accounts the 
organisational purpose is expanded to include a responsibility towards the public whose 
trust and confidence have to be gained by full information disclosure.  
 
(2) Stakeholder identification and salience (insiders vs. outsiders) 
In the initial account the relationship between the organisation and its environment is 
conceptualised as a dichotomy of insiders (including management and employees) and 
undifferentiated outsiders. Their relationship is characterised by mutual distrust and 
lack of understanding expressed by the metaphor of not having a common language. 
Information disclosure is kept to a bare minimum. In subsequent CEO accounts a wide 
range of stakeholders, including, customers, the general public, the media, and 
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politicians are identified who management wants to engage in a dialogue. 
 
(3) Stakeholder management (confrontation vs. dialogue) 
Due to the strong anti-nuclear sentiments in Germany the public is portrayed as hostile 
in the initial account and treated as any other threat faced by the organisation 
(O’Higgins, 2010). Management regards organisational audiences’ interpretations of 
the incident to be biased and drafts in external experts ‘in order to render the debate 
more neutral and objective’ (document 1). The creation of monitors and watchdogs 
constitutes symbolic management in the form of strategic restructuring. 
 
The use of metaphor, particularly during a crisis, “signals strong and nuanced 
leadership” (Amernic and Craig, 2007, p. 29). However, the opposite is also true. Klaus 
Rauscher’s ill-judged choice of the metaphor of warfare (‘enemies’, ‘attack’, ‘bunker’), 
persecution (‘witch hunt’, ‘victim’), alienates the public to such an extent that the 
organisation’s legitimacy is further damaged. It results in a series of executive 
replacements in Vattenfall’s German subsidiary (including Klaus Rauscher’s own 
resignation). In subsequent accounts Vattenfall’s initial lack of understanding of 
stakeholder views and expectations is expressed by means of the metaphor of language 
learning (‘to know and to understand what is the language of our customers’ [sic!], 
document 6). In the initial account the outside world is portrayed as hostile which 
results in Vattenfall sealing itself off from outside influences and management and 
employees adopting a ‘certain bunker mentality’ (document 3). This results in releasing 
“as little information as possible, admit[ting] only what can no longer be denied and 
downplay[ing] the facts” (Bartsch et al., 2007). The ‘new start’ (document 2) is 
characterised by redefining stakeholders as partners, rather than enemies. This entails 
reconstructing the boundary between the organisation and society as permeable, with 
organisational constituents and information moving freely between the organisation and 
its environment (‘we become more present as management outside’, document 6). 
 
(4) Performance metrics (correctness vs. understanding) 
The initial account is characterised by instrumental rationality. Focusing on technical 
issues relating to the incident and emphasising procedures and protocols, it emphasises 
action based on reason and fact. By contrast, subsequent accounts are characterised by 
substantive rationality. Vattenfall’s attempt to empathise with stakeholders in order to 
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gain public trust it promotes action based on empathy, emotion, and dialogue. 
 
(5) Boundary between organisation and stakeholders (closed vs. open) 
In the initial account Klaus Rauscher constructs Vattenfall as separate from society. This 
manifests itself in the use of the binary opposites of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Management 
and employees are regarded as located inside the organisation and stakeholders, the 
public and the media, as located outside the organisation. This results in the view of 
stakeholders as not having any intrinsic right to information. In the initial account 
Vattenfall is portrayed as hermetically sealed off from its environment (‘bunker 
mentality’, document 3).  Subsequent accounts are characterised by the metaphor of a 
physical barrier between the organisation and its environment which management 
needs to ‘break through’ (document 3) by means of ‘hold[ing] open houses’ (document 
3) and by ‘transparent information and good communication’ (document 9). 
 
5.4 Discussion 
The confidence crisis following the initial misjudgement of the situation forces 
Vattenfall to redefine its relationship with its stakeholders in order to restore its badly 
damaged legitimacy. For this purpose, Vattenfall’s CEOs provide a negotiated account 
which takes organisational audiences’ views into consideration (documents 2 to 9). This 
is framed within the discourse of stakeholder engagement. Emphasising understanding 
and consideration, management aims to re-align Vattenfall’s norms and values with that 
of society in order to restore the firm’s badly damaged legitimacy. Depending on 
whether this is accompanied by any real changes in organisational practices and values 
or entails merely a manipulation of audience perceptions of practices and values, this 
either constitutes substantive or symbolic management. What is more, the eight CEO 
texts constituting subsequent accounts of the indecent (documents 2 to 9) are 
characterised by a high level of intertextuality. This suggests that management uses the 
discourse of stakeholder engagement to bring Vattenfall’s communication in line with 
institutional norms which are characterised by openness, transparency, and corporate 
social responsibility. In the same vein, depending on whether this is accompanied by a 
change in organisational structures and processes or merely by a mere manipulation of 
audience perceptions of these structures and processes, this constitutes either 
isomorphism or decoupling.  
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Evidence from the micro-level analysis and the discourse practice context suggests that 
Vattenfall’s CEOs strategically use the discourse of stakeholder engagement to 
persuade organisational audiences that Vattenfall has changed its stance towards its 
stakeholders. Lars G. Josefsson’s statement in relation to Vattenfall’s interim results 
suggests that Vattenfall’s professed stakeholder engagement is more about achieving 
‘a turn around in public image’ (document 4), rather than a real change in values. The 
contradiction between espoused and actual values is also evident in Lars G. Josefsson’s 
statement relating to Klaus Rauscher’s resignation (document 2) Lars G. Josefsson’s 
mixes the discourse of stakeholder engagement with the discourse of economics: ‘We 
represent the values of effectiveness, responsibility and, most importantly, openness’ 
(emphasis added by authors). In the same statement he claims that ‘Vattenfall wants to 
be a company which “understands their [customers’] concerns”, and which is their 
“first choice amongst all its competitors” (emphasis added by authors). What is more, 
in the CEO’s message of Vattenfall’s 2007 annual report (document 8) Lars G. 
Josefsson uses an accounting metaphor (‘our most precious asset’) in relation to ‘trust’.  
This suggests that Vattenfall’s CEOs adopt an ad hoc normative attitude to stakeholders 
(O’Higgins, 2010) for public relations and placatory reasons to resolve the conflict 
between the organisation and its audiences following the incident at Krümmel. Thus, 
the discourse of stakeholder engagement serves as a means of signalling a change in 
stakeholder orientation, yet maintaining the status quo. The high level of intertextuality 
in the eight subsequent CEO accounts of the incident suggests that the discourse of 
stakeholder engagement becomes institutionalised during the six-month period of 
observation, yet evidence from our micro-level analysis and from the discourse practice 
context suggests that the emphasis on openness, transparency, and corporate social 
responsibility, is decoupled from actual organisational values and practices. This 
suggests that Vattenfall’s CEOs strategically use discourse to manufacture 
organisational audiences’ consent regarding the continued operation of the Krümmel 
power plant and the deceleration of the nuclear phase out in Germany. 
 
What is more, the dialogue campaign in German newspapers following the incident in 
Krümmel constitutes a temporary ad hoc project (symbolic management), rather than a 
genuine change in organisational practices (substantive management), as “the left half 
of the ads presented the number of a special service hotline, the right half was made up 
of frequently asked questions concerning the ecological responsibility of the 
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corporation. The questions were both asked and answered by the corporation” (Schultz 
and Wehmeier, 2010, p. 19). Vattenfall uses a similar monologic strategy in its 2007 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report where the newly appointed Chief Nuclear 
Officer Per-Olof Waessman is ‘interviewed’ by Vattenfall. This means Vattenfall has 
control over both questions and answers. The dialogue campaign can therefore be 
regarded as a mere “placation and co-optation” (O’Higgins, 2010, p. 163) mechanism. 
What is more, it is primarily directed at customers by whom Vattenfall wants to be 
perceived as ‘a progressive, empathetic, easily accessible and reliable partner’ 
(document 8). Greenpeace, a key stakeholder, is excluded from dialogue. This is 
probably due to Vattenfall’s perception of Greenpeace as too hostile to be placated. 
Greenpeace exposes Vattenfall’s discourse of corporate social responsibility as 
greenwash on its website by means of a so-called ‘Schwarzbuch’ (literally, ‘black 
book’). “By issuing misleading reports and pseudo-initiatives regarding climate change 
the firm attempt to hoodwink the public” (Greenpeace). 
 
Our findings support O’Higgins’ (2010) argument that organisations with an 
instrumental stakeholder orientation tend to resolve conflicts of interest between the 
organisation and its audiences by resorting to impression management, rather than 
instigating real changes. It would be interesting to explore how an organisation with a 
normative stakeholder orientation responds to a legitimacy threat. We would expect 
management to adopt a discourse of stakeholder engagement accompanied by a two-
way dialogue with organisational audiences and real changes in organisational practices 
and values (O’Higgins, 2010). This opens up possibilities for future research, possibly 
in the form of two-case study or multi-case study research based on organisations with 
contrasting stakeholder orientations. 
 
There are two limitations to the study. First, we focus on a relatively short period of 
time. Only a longitudinal study in the vein of Mäkelä and Laine (2011), who analyse 
the corporate reporting practices of a Finnish company over a nine-year period, would 
be able to establish whether the change in discourse resulting from external pressures 
exerted upon Vattenfall by antagonistic organisational audiences in the aftermath of the 
incident becomes institutionalised. Second, as the main focus of our analysis is on CEO 
texts, we do not know whether and how organisational audiences responded to the 
change in discourse (apart from Greenpeace whose reaction is discussed in Section 5.4). 
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Only a detailed analysis of newspaper articles in the vein of Breton and Coté (20060 
and Aerts and Cormier (2009) would be able to establish whether stakeholders accepted 
Vattenfall’s reality construction and were indeed placated by it. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In our analysis of managerial discourse after a legitimacy-threatening incident in a 
nuclear power plant in Germany we find that CEOs switch from technocratic discourse 
to a discourse of stakeholder engagement to resolve a conflict between the organisation 
and its audiences. Management uses the discourse of stakeholder engagement to signal 
a change in its stance towards its stakeholders. However, evidence from the micro-level 
analysis and the discourse practice context indicates that this change in discourse does 
not go hand in hand with changes in values and organisational practices and thus 
constitutes symbolic, rather than substantive management. We find that discourse in 
corporate communication is used as a means of placating antagonistic organisational 
audiences and manufacturing their consent. The use of discourse as a means of 
constructing reality in a way that benefits the company at the expense of society is an 
ethical issue, as it sustains relations of domination. Our findings thus contribute to the 
critical corporate communication literature which regards corporate narrative reporting 
as a means of consolidating the private interests of corporations, rather than increasing 
transparency and accountability (e.g., Cho, 2009; Mäkelä and Laine, 2011; Merkl-
Davies and Koller, 2011). What is more, our findings indicate that CEOs put forward 
an account of events that serves their ends, rather than being accountable to 
organisational stakeholders and to society. However, if CEOs are myopically focused 
on furthering their own ends and are encouraged to do so by ‘yes-men’, they may put 
the company at risk.  
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Appendix 1 illustrates our text analysis approach by means of quotes from the nine 
CEO texts. For each area the left-hand column represents the instrumental dimension 
of stakeholder orientation and the right-hand column the normative dimension of 
stakeholder orientation.  
 
   
Appendix 1: Contrasting technocratic discourse and the discourse of stakeholder engagement 
in Vattenfall’s CEO texts 
   
   
(1) Organisational purpose 
Regulatory body (Obligation) Stakeholders (Trust) 
 “Clearly, immediate and extensive 
information was submitted to the 
authorities” (document 4)  
 “Ensuring that the general public feel safe 
and trust our ability to provide power” 
(Document  9) 
 “But it's also correct that we consistently 
complied with our obligation to notify the 
authorities.” (document  3) 
 “Rebuilding confidence in Germany” 
(document  4) 
  “Ensuring that the general public feel safe 
and trust our ability to provide power” 
(Document  9) 
  “This lack of confidence on part of the 
public, customers and other stakeholders is 
to some extent our own fault” (document  4) 
  “We must put more emphasis into the 
dialogue with employees, customers and 
other stakeholders to develop trust and 
confidence” (document  4) 
  “Our main priorities are operative safety and 
the building of trust and confidence” 
(document  7) 
  “Our responsibility is not limited to safe 
operation, but also trying to answer ... 
questions [from the public]. It’s part of our 
effort to be a good corporate citizen. The 
public expects continuous and 
comprehensive information, transparency, 
honesty and openness” (document  9) 
  “We want and have to restore the lost trust 
in Vattenfall Europe as an organisation “ 
(document  5) 
  “Power companies only earn public 
acceptance, if they can demonstrate that 
their activities serve the public good” 
(document  2) 
  “And we have then brought into place a 
‘restore trust campaign’. And this is we 
have to work on our main objectives that we 
restore lost credibility and trust as an 
important basis for our business success” 
(document  6) 
  “It is our responsibility alone to win public 
trust in our nuclear power plants” (document  
2) 
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  “A company restricting its disclosures to 
statement of a purely technical nature 
stressing the lack of safety implications of 
the incident has not taken its social 
responsibility seriously enough. Any 
organisation which runs highly technically 
complex operations such as nuclear power 
plants is not only accountable to the 
regulatory body, but also to the public whose 
trust and approval needs to be won means of 
dialogue.” We have a special responsibility 
in this respect” (document  2) 
  “The demands on us as an energy company 
can be summarised with the words Safety 
and Trust” (document  8) 
  “Trust, in turn, is our most precious asset” 
(document  8) 
  “Trust must also be the foundation of our 
aspirations to get our customers to perceive 
us as being a progressive, empathetic, easily 
accessible and reliable partner” (document  
8) 
  
(2) Stakeholder identification and salience  
Bunker (Insiders) Outside world( Outsiders) 
 “Employees at nuclear power plants often 
don't understand other people, while 
outsiders don't understand nuclear energy.” 
(document  3) 
 “Employees at nuclear power plants often 
don't understand other people, while 
outsiders don't understand nuclear energy.” 
(document  3) 
 “Our employees are not afraid of nuclear 
power, but sometimes they are afraid of the 
outside world. Many believe that people out 
there are their enemies and that anything 
they say will only be used against them.” 
(document  3) 
 “Our employees are not afraid of nuclear 
power, but sometimes they are afraid of the 
outside world. Many believe that people out 
there are their enemies and that anything 
they say will only be used against them.” 
(document  3) 
 “We created an open-book policy with all 
of our stakeholders so they get direct access 
to our information and we become more 
present as management outside” (document  
6) 
 “We created an open-book policy with all of 
our stakeholders so they get direct access to 
our information and we become more 
present as management outside” (document  
6) 
  “So we made an active dialogue with public, 
media and politicians” (document  6) 
  “Our problem was our inability to 
communicate this to the public” (documents  
9) 
  “Ensuring that the general public feel safe 
and trust our ability to provide power” 
(documents  9) 
  “We must put more emphasis into the 
dialogue with employees, customers and 
other stakeholders to develop trust and 
confidence” (document  4) 
  “This lack of confidence on part of the 
public, customers and other stakeholders is 
to some extent our own fault” (document  4) 
  
(3) Stakeholder management  
Enemy (Confrontation) Partner (Dialogue) 
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 “Our employees are not afraid of nuclear 
power, but sometimes they are afraid of the 
outside world. Many believe that people out 
there are their enemies and that anything 
they say will only be used against them” 
(document  3) 
 “A company restricting its disclosures to 
statement of a purely technical nature 
stressing the lack of safety implications of 
the incident has not taken its social 
responsibility seriously enough. Any 
organisation which runs highly technically 
complex operations such as nuclear power 
plants is not only accountable to the 
regulatory body, but also to the public whose 
trust and approval needs to be won means of 
dialogue.” We have a special responsibility 
in this respect” (document  2) 
 “Yes, there is a certain bunker mentality.” 
(document  3) 
 “So we made an active dialogue with public, 
media and politicians” (document  6) 
 “We are currently being attacked by people 
from a political persuasion who are against 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Opponents of nuclear energy are 
undoubtedly using the incidents in 
Brunsbüttel and Krümmel to their 
advantage.” (document  1)) 
 “We must put more emphasis into the 
dialogue with employees, customers and 
other stakeholders to develop trust and 
confidence” (document  4) 
 
 “Our employees are not afraid of nuclear 
power, but sometimes they are afraid of the 
outside world. Many believe that people out 
there are their enemies and that anything 
they say will only be used against them” 
(document  3) 
 “Our problem was our inability to 
communicate this to the public” (documents  
9) 
 “However we cannot solely see ourselves 
as victims of a campaign against nuclear 
power” (document  1) 
 “We must make sure that we provide 
transparent information and good 
communication” (document  9) 
 “I refuse to participate in a witch hunt 
initiated in political circles, especially not 
against any of my colleagues in the nuclear 
power plants” (document  1) 
 
  
(4) Performance metrics 
Facts (Correctness)  Feeling (Understanding) 
 “The rapid shutdown was carried out 
properly and correctly” (document  1) 
 
 
 “Ensuring that the general public feel safe 
and trust our ability to provide power” 
(Document  9) 
 “Both incidents were classified as 0 (zero) 
on the international, seven-point INES-
scale, i.e. as incidents of ‘no safety 
significance’. The emergency shutdowns 
were carried out correctly” (document  1) 
 “Questions arise that sometimes lead to 
fears” (document  9) 
 “Incidents are classified according to an 
international scale. This scale ranges from 
zero to seven. The fire at Krümmel was in 
category "zero," which means that it was 
insignificant or of only minor significance 
in terms of safety.” (document  3) 
 “I also understand people’s fears” 
(document  3) 
 “But it’s also correct that we consistently 
complied with our obligation to notify the 
authorities.” (document  3) 
 “I am particularly saddened that we have 
disappointed a lot of customers in our loyal 
markets in Hamburg and Berlin” (document  
3) 
 “A safety culture entails the responsible 
handling of facts and evaluations” 
(document  1) 
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 “Take a look at the facts.” (document  3)  
 “The events ... were from a technical 
perspective minor ... Both events were 
classified as a zero in the seven degree 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), 
i.e. deviations with ‘no safety significance’: 
(document  9)  
 
 “The safety system following the scrams at 
the nuclear power plants worked properly” 
(document  9) 
 
 “I am going to employ external experts as 
personal advisors… in order to render the 
public debate more neutral and objective” 
(document  1) 
 
 
(5) Boundary between organisation and environment 
Closed Open 
 “Our employees are not afraid of nuclear 
power, but sometimes they are afraid of the 
outside world. Many believe that people out 
there are their enemies and that anything 
they say will only be used against them” 
(document  3) 
 “We created an open-book policy with all of 
our stakeholders so they get direct access to 
our information and we become more 
present as management outside” (document  
6) 
  “Employees at nuclear power plants often 
don't understand other people, while 
outsiders don't understand nuclear energy. 
Of course, in this sort of psychological 
situation management bears a special 
responsibility to break through this 
mentality and establish a culture of 
openness” (document  3) 
   “We will pursue a public information policy 
of openness and transparency in the future. 
For example, we plan to hold open houses at 
our power plants” (document  3) 
   “We represent the values of effectives, 
responsibility and, most importantly, 
openness” (document  2) 
  “We must make sure that we provide 
transparent information and good 
communication” (document  9) 
  
 
